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<Abstract>Abstract 
In 1584, Reginald Scot claimed that jugglers who performed magic tricks were mistaken for 
witches. The claim was repeated, and later became the basis of the Victorian idea of “modern 
magic.” According to stage conjurors and writers on magic, “modern magic” was magic that 
was (now) understood to be an illusion. The claim continued to be repeated by amateur 
historians of magic, who reinforced this idea of “modern magic” by citing cases of early 
modern jugglers who were persecuted as witches. In recent years, “modern magic,” as a 
distinctly modern form of magic that was understood to be an illusion, has become part of 
modern cultural history.  
 The view that magic tricks were mistaken for witchcraft, however, is not to be found 
in the historiography of the early modern period. Indeed, it is a myth. When one examines 
how magic tricks and witchcraft were compared, one sees that there was a clear distinction 
made between the two. Nevertheless, despite the lack of evidence, the myth continued to 
survive. It was used to justify the exposure of secrets, enhanced Victorian conjurors’ 
respectability, and it fitted neatly within the modern narrative of rational progress. It persisted 
due to the uncritical reading of sources by some historians, whose examples of persecution 
were the result of misinterpretation. Thus, “modern magic,” as a form of magic that was 
understood to be an illusion, was not a particularly modern phenomenon. Indeed, despite 
some changes in how magic was experienced, early modern views of magic were remarkably 
similar to modern ones. 
 
Introduction 
In the early sixteenth century, Thomas Brandon killed a pigeon. Brandon was the king’s 
juggler, and he killed the pigeon in the following manner. He painted a picture of a dove on a 
wall, and pointed to a pigeon on top of a nearby roof. He then asked the king and his 
company to watch, as he stabbed the picture of the dove with a knife. The pigeon fell from 
the roof, “starke dead.”1 This story appeared in Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witchcraft 
(1584), in which the author claimed that those who had witnessed Brandon’s feat had 
believed that it was real, and that this would still be the case. “If this, or the like feate should 
be done by an old woman,” Scot declared, “everie bodie would crie out for fier and faggot to 
burne the witch.”2  
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 As we shall see, the claim that magic tricks were mistaken for witchcraft continued to 
be made in a variety of contexts. Following Scot, it appeared in books that revealed how 
magic tricks were done. In the nineteenth century, it was repeated by Victorian conjurors, and 
by the earliest historians of conjuring, who used it to construct the idea of “modern magic.” 
According to them, “modern magic” was understood to be an illusion, in contrast with the 
magic of the past, which had been thought to be real. Later amateur historians of conjuring 
reinforced the narrative of a transformation in how magic was seen, by citing evidence of 
earlier confusion, including examples of early modern jugglers who had been persecuted for 
witchcraft. In recent years, cultural historians have presented “modern magic” as a distinctly 
modern form of magic that was understood to be an illusion. However, the claim that early 
modern magic tricks were mistaken for witchcraft, and the narrative of “modern magic” that 
it supported, is incorrect. 
 This may not seem surprising to historians of the early modern period, who have long 
rejected the view that witchcraft beliefs reflected a less rational age.3 Such beliefs not only 
made sense in the context of wider contemporary religious, political, cultural and legal 
concerns, but also were bound up with early scientific thought. There was no simple 
boundary between magical beliefs and contemporary natural philosophy. Although 
Ddemonologists were more empirical, they and had more in common with sceptics, than we 
previously thought.4 Indeed, early modern debates about extraordinary phenomena, from 
miracles to physical anomalies, were, like subsequent such debates, a means through which 
criteria for establishing facts could be constructed.5 In a variety of ways, magical beliefs 
throughout the early modern period were more complex, and less specific to the period, than 
traditional historical narratives have assumed.6 In the words of Malcolm Gaskill, “there was 
no avalanche of reason and disenchantment, rather a slowly evolving matrix of assertion, 
association, and meaning.”7 Within this more complex picture, assumptions about early 
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modern gullibility are deeply problematic.  
 Indeed, insofar as academic historians of the period have discussed the perception of 
magic tricks, they have not found a great deal of confusion. Keith Thomas briefly remarked 
that “the tricks performed for entertainment by conjurers and jugglers were sometimes 
suspected to involve diabolical aid,” while P. G. Maxwell-Stuart has stated that “[p]eople 
were perfectly capable of recognizing that not everything which appeared to be miraculous, 
preternatural, or demonic was actually so.”8 Comparisons between witchcraft and the tricks 
of jugglers were certainly made by contemporary commentators. As Stuart Clark has shown, 
references to juggling were a significant theme not only in debates about witchcraft but also 
in wider discussions that reflected growing uncertainty about visual perception.9 However, 
with the exception of Thomas’ brief comment, there is nothing to suggest that audiences 
regarded the tricks of jugglers as genuine magic.10  
 The lack of comment on such confusion reflects a lack of contemporary evidence. 
However, the topic nevertheless deserves further consideration. First, a lack of confusion is 
not a self-evident matter. Jugglers were performing magical effects, while concealing the 
modus operandi. In a context of widespread concerns about witchcraft, one might well expect 
such feats to be treated with suspicion. Since the debate about the reality of witchcraft often 
included references to magic tricks, there was certainly room for confusion. How, then, were 
magic tricks viewed in relation to witchcraft? Second, if there is no evidence to support it, 
then how and why did the myth survive? Third, those who have claimed that such confusion 
existed have cited evidence, including several examples of jugglers being persecuted for 
witchcraft, and these cases have never been examined.  
 This article, then, begins by making the explicit case that there is no evidence that 
early modern Europeans readily confused trickery and witchcraft. It considers how magic 
tricks and witchcraft were compared, and explains why, though there was certainly room for 
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confusion, such comparisons both reflected and reinforced a clear distinction between the two 
even though there was certainly room for confusion. It describes how, despite the lack of 
evidence, the myth continued to survive in certain contexts. The myth could be used to justify 
the exposure of conjuring secrets, and to aid Victorian conjurors in their quest for 
respectability. More generally, it fitted all too easily within the wider narrative of progress 
from superstition to reason, and it persisted due to the uncritical reading of sources by some 
subsequent historians. The article also examines the cases of persecution that have been cited 
and shows how each was the result of misinterpretation. It concludes by arguing that “modern 
magic,” as a form of magic that was understood to be an illusion, was not a particularly 
modern phenomenon. On the contrary, though there were subtle changes in how magic was 
experienced, early modern views of magic were, in many respects, remarkably similar to 
modern ones. 
 
Magic Tricks Viewed as Trickery 
 It is hard to find any evidence of early modern jugglers being persecuted for 
witchcraft.11 In addition to his comment about Brandon’s pigeon, Reginald Scot referred to 
card tricks that were performed “to the wonder and astonishment of simple beholders, which 
conceive not that kind of illusion, but expect miracles and strange works.” Such rhetoric was 
part of his larger argument that “a naturall thing [can] be made to seeme supernaturall.”12 In 
order to illustrate this point, Scot revealed how various magic tricks were done, but he 
provided no evidence of anyone mistaking magic tricks for witchcraft. Indeed, he had not 
even been present when Brandon performed the pigeon trick. He was merely reciting a story 
he had heard about something that had happened at least four decades earlier.13 Furthermore, 
even if we take the story at face value, Brandon was not persecuted. On the contrary, he was 
licensed by the king to entertain, was paid rather well for his services, and was even made a 
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Freeman of the City of London.14 Surely, if Scot had wished to show that innocent 
performers were being accused of witchcraft, then he could have found a better example. 
 However, this is not what Scot was trying to do. Scot’s reason for explaining how 
magic tricks were done was not to show that people were taking them seriously, but to show 
that things might appear to be magical when they were not. He was also quite clear that 
juggling was harmless if the juggler stated that it was trickery; indeed, he commended 
jugglers who “always acknowledge wherein the art consisteth.”15 This is a crucial distinction. 
On the one hand, there were people who, by deploying trickery and other natural means, 
pretended to have occult powers. These people, of course, might be accused of witchcraft. On 
the other hand, there were people who performed magic tricks as entertainment, and who 
were open about their use of trickery. The relevant question here is whether or not this latter 
group was being accused of witchcraft. Scot provided no evidence that this was the case. 
Neither did the early magic books that followed in his wake, which repeated his views almost 
verbatim, plagiarizing large chunks of his book.16 
 In 1655, Thomas Ady referred to “silly people” who thought that juggling tricks were 
the work of the devil.17 However, he only provided one example of any serious confusion: 
“there was a Master of Arts condemned only for using himself to the study and practice of the 
Jugling craft.”18 This example, he explained, came from Scot’s Discoverie. But the man to 
whom Scot had referred was not a performer of magic tricks; he was an occultist who had 
been condemned for practicing theurgy.19 Fellow sceptics of witchcraft echoed Scot’s claim 
that gullible people mistook trickery for the real thing, but the examples that they gave were 
of individuals who used trickery to con folk out of money, or to fake bewitchment.20 In other 
words, these were not entertainers either, but the kinds of deceivers who have long 
succeeded, and continue to succeed, in conning the public. 
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 Meanwhile, it is not at all hard to find evidence that, throughout the early modern 
period, audiences did indeed understand that magic tricks were illusions. There were jugglers 
who made a living from performing outdoors, at fairs and markets, and sometimes indoors 
for more select company. Unless there was a well-established frame through which people 
could view their feats as tricks, this would have led to regular accusations of witchcraft, but 
this was not the case. 21 Magic tricks could be bought in shops, and books were sold that 
explained how tricks were done. 22 So far as these books referred to witchcraft, it was to make 
the distinction clearer. Even before Scot, there were texts that described how magic tricks 
were done in England, Germany, Italy and France. Alongside practical domestic advice, these 
books described how to do various tricks as an innocent form of diversion.23 In the same year 
that Scot published Discoverie, Jean Prevost published La premiere partie des subtiles et 
plaisantes inventions (1584), which presented magic tricks as harmless fun.24 
 The fact that people might be deceived by charlatans did not prevent the public from 
enjoying magic tricks as entertainment. This is why some jugglers were able to gain 
impressive reputations, such as William Vincent (a.k.a. Hocus Pocus) in England, Gonin in 
France, and Scoto (sometimes Scotto) in Italy.25 They performed for the elite of society, and 
could hardly have done so if they had been suspected of witchcraft. Indeed, there are 
accounts of individuals who observed magic tricks, understood that they were illusions, and 
speculated on how they might be done. When Scoto entertained Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol 
in 1572, the court physician expressed his inability to figure out how the tricks were done, 
but there was no suggestion that it was due to witchcraft.26 Girolamo Cardano described the 
“incredible tricks” of a young Neapolitan man, and confessed how he and others were unable 
to discover what was going on, but concluded that they were all due to “skill in the art of 
legerdemain.”27 Later, Francis Bacon recalled seeing a card trick, which he had discussed 
with a learned man. Bacon had suggested that it might be due to confederacy, while the 
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learned man had suggested that the juggler had used a psychological ruse. There was no 
mention of the possibility of witchcraft.28  
It was not merely intellectuals who made the distinction. Throughout the early 
modern period, magic tricks, including some described by Scot, were being used as theatrical 
effects. As Philip Butterworth has described in detail, actors were being stabbed, hanged and 
decapitated on stage, and these effects were designed to be convincing.29 Audiences did not 
protest, or run from the theatre in fear. On the contrary, these effects were used because they 
attracted the public. For this reason, sometimes they were added, even when they were 
unnecessary to the plot, and so provided a form of entertainment that might be independent of 
the play itself.30 These magical effects were being used to entertain a public who were 
perfectly aware that they were watching illusions, even when they did not know how they 
were done. There is, then, clear evidence of a well-established frame through which magic 
tricks were viewed as nothing more than trickery.  
 Nevertheless, comparisons were often made between magic tricks and witchcraft, 
which meant that there was room for confusion. And, as we shall see, from the nineteenth 
century, some certainly felt that this had been the case. However, when we consider the 
nature of the comparisons, we can see not only that there was a clear contemporary 
distinction made between magic tricks and witchcraft, but also why a modern reader might 
think that there was not. 
 
Magic Tricks and Witchcraft Compared 
 Early modern writers often compared magic tricks with witchcraft. However, this was 
because, like Scot, they were trying to make a point about the reality of witchcraft. In doing 
so, they used the tricks of jugglers as both metaphorical and explanatory devices. The devil 
was often compared to a “juggler,” as one who engaged in deception and illusion, and 
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jugglers’ tricks were used to illustrate how diabolical illusions might deceive the senses.31 At 
the level of metaphor, they served as a means to make feats of witchcraft easier to 
comprehend. In that sense, like descriptions of natural magic, they could help the reader find 
the idea of real magical phenomena more plausible.32  
 However, the idea that magic tricks were the result of diabolical processes was not a 
theme. Rather, magic tricks were used by both demonologists and sceptics as a way to argue, 
respectively, for and against the reality of witchcraft. One of the ways to deny the reality of 
witchcraft was to argue, like Scot, that it was no more real than the tricks performed by 
jugglers. Most demonologists, on the other hand, argued that witchcraft was real, unlike the 
tricks performed by jugglers. Thus, even the Malleus Maleficarum distinguished between 
witchcraft and the kind of “human prestidigitatory art” that “can be done without devils, since 
it is artificially done by the agility of men who show things and conceal them, as in the case 
of the tricks of conjurers and ventriloquists.”33   
 In doing so, terms were used that might suggest to a modern reader that there was 
confusion. Thus, for example, “juggling” and “illusion” might be used in reference to the 
work of the devil, but authors made distinctions between juggling and illusions that involved 
evil spirits and those that relied on sleight of hand.34 William Perkins, for example, defined 
“juggling” in a way that was broad enough to include diabolical delusions that were beyond 
nature, yet he also noted that “divers men, by reason of the agilitie of their bodies, & sleight 
of their hands, are able to work divers feats, which seem strange to the beholders, and yet not 
meddle with Witchcraft.”35 Thus, while it might be said that the Devil engaged in “juggling,” 
this did not mean that a trick performed by a juggler was seen as diabolical. On the contrary, 
the tricks of jugglers were cited as familiar real-world examples of a different kind of magic 
(or a different kind of “juggling”), one that was not real. It was precisely because they were 
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generally understood to be the product of trickery that they could be used to illustrate such 
distinctions. 
 While making such a distinction in principle, the question remained over whether or 
not particular cases might be explained by trickery. Throughout the debate, both sides 
naturally relied on Scripture in support of their claims. In short, if witchcraft was in the Bible, 
then it could be considered to be real, so proponents claimed that witches were in the Bible, 
while sceptics argued that they were not. For example, sceptics, argued that the resurrection 
of Samuel by the Witch of Endor was trickery.36 Scot, for one, claimed that the resurrection 
had been an illusion that relied on ventriloquism.37 Some also disputed the Egyptian 
magicians in Exodus, who had tried to copy the miracles of Moses and Aaron by 
transforming rods into serpents, turning water into blood, and making frogs appear. Sceptics, 
such as Scot and Ady, denied that this was witchcraft, arguing instead that it was a piece of 
juggling.38 Indeed, some sceptics even suggested how it might have been done. John 
Webster, for example, claimed that the rod went up the sleeve, and was substituted by a fake 
serpent, made from linen and animated by wire. “As for the changing water into blood, and 
the producing of Frogs,” he continued, “they were so easy to be done after the same manner, 
that they need not any particular explication.”39 If this explanation sounds rather vague, it 
was no more convincing to demonologists. Joseph Glanvill, for example, wondered how 
“those jugglers should know what signs Moses and Aaron would shew and accordingly 
furnish themselves with counterfeit Serpents, Blood and Frogs … or had they those always in 
their pockets? If not, it was great luck for them that Moses and Aaron should shew those very 
miracles.”40  
Nevertheless, even those who argued for the reality of witchcraft made a place for 
harmless juggling. “As if a merry Juggler who plays tricks of Legerdemain at a Fair or 
Market,” wrote Henry More in 1678, “were such an abomination to either the God of Israel, 
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or to his Law-giver Moses; or as if an Hocus Pocus so wise a wight as to be consulted as an 
Oracle.”41 Comparisons between witches and jugglers, then, could be used to contrast 
innocent tricks with the dangerous reality of witchcraft.42 While jugglers’ trickery could 
challenge the reality of witchcraft by being cited as an alternative explanation, some argued it 
inadequately explained away the reality of witchcraft. In any case, it was widely agreed that 
Biblical miracles were real and that there were magic tricks that relied on sleight of hand. In 
that sense, as in others, the views of witch-hunters and witch-sceptics were not so far apart.43 
 Some, however, suggested that jugglers were in league with the devil. They did not 
doubt that jugglers performed tricks, but claimed that this was not all that they did. There had 
always been those who mistrusted jugglers and who, rightly or wrongly, associated them with 
charlatans and mountebanks. In the context of the witchcraft debate, however, Satan was 
suspected of being the source of all manner of delusions and deceptions, so where there was 
deception, the devil might not be far away. Jean Bodin, for example, claimed that jugglers 
often became witches and that they performed tricks alongside feats of genuine magic in 
order to lull people into believing that these feats were merely tricks.44 The mixture of truth 
and fiction was referred to by John Foxe, who wrote that “certayn persons fitte to doe 
mischiefe, do publish abroad as it were the sugred tast of hony mixt with poyson, therby the 
soner to be taken: working and causing through their slight and subtiltyes, that errour should 
be taken for veritye.”45 Martin Del Rio picked up on Bodin’s point, that jugglers usually 
mixed magic tricks with genuine magic, in order to persuade people that “whatever 
witchcraft they mix in may seem to be the result of subtility and agility;” as a result, the 
audience could be “enticed into absurd joy and astonishment and account everything mere 
fun and not something which ought to be punished.”46 It was said of Bornelio Feats that he 
“mixed diabolical assistance with trickery to make his wickedness less suspected.”47 
According to Reginald Scot, Feats was not only a juggler but also a witch, who sold familiars 
  11 
and consultations under another name.48 As far as Scot was concerned, he had no actual 
magical powers, but was a charlatan who exploited others. In addition to having great skill 
with playing cards, he was known for conning people out of money.49 This is, no doubt, 
precisely the sort of person who used sleight-of-hand, and other kinds of trickery, in order to 
pretend to have genuine magical powers. However, in this case, he was suspected of using 
trickery to conceal magical powers.50 
 So, while it was generally agreed, in principle, that there were magic tricks that did 
not rely on diabolical means, some suspected that those who performed them might also 
indulge in witchcraft. This would seem to be an obvious reason why jugglers might be 
persecuted for being witches, yet this was not the case. Alternatively, it might seem to be, at 
the very least, reason for confusion. Indeed, it was on this basis that Keith Thomas stated that 
some tricks of jugglers were suspected of involving diabolical aid.51 Perhaps some people did 
indeed observe a juggler performing tricks, and suspected that some of his feats were aided 
by the devil. After all, the occasional attribution of a magic trick, performed as entertainment, 
to some form of genuine magic, has remained a well-known phenomenon.52 However, they 
could not have been typical of the period, since the very idea - that mixing trickery and 
witchcraft was a way to conceal the latter - rested on the assumption that the audience would 
think that they were simply watching tricks. The very idea assumed that the public regarded 
the feats of jugglers as mere trickery.  
Comparisons between magic tricks and witchcraft, then, both reflected and reinforced 
a normative mentality that distinguished clearly between the two. Despite the lack of 
evidence, however, the view that early modern audiences struggled to do this was common 
throughout the nineteenth century, continued to be voiced in amateur histories of conjuring 
throughout the twentieth century, and appeared most recently in the cultural history of 
“modern magic.” This, then, begs the question, how did the myth survive? 
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The Persistence of the Myth 
 For at least two centuries after Scot, the claim was repeated by authors of books that 
revealed how magic tricks were done. This served a useful rhetorical purpose, as it provided a 
justification for the exposure of jugglers’ tricks of the trade and presented the authors’ work 
as having broader relevance than might appear to be the case.53 Indeed, such a strategy could 
be found in books that did not draw upon Scot. In France, Jean Prevost justified exposing the 
secrets of conjuring as part of an attempt to educate an ignorant public about the dangers of 
deception and self-deception, thus presenting his work as “useful to the public.”54 In the late 
eighteenth century, this argument was an ideal fit with the notion of “rational recreations.”55 
Later, when the first histories of conjuring appeared in the nineteenth century, they cited 
these earlier sources as evidence that previous generations had mistaken magic tricks for 
witchcraft.56 
 By then, such a view seemed entirely plausible. Indeed, in the early eighteenth 
century, beliefs in magic and witchcraft were already being seen as an anachronism in the 
‘Age of Enlightenment.’57 However, it became an increasingly prominent theme that such 
beliefs had been held in the past, and that now they were seen as irrational. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, this theme expanded could be found beyond the obvious contexts, such as 
discourses about natural magic and spiritualism, and intoin the popular press.58 With the 
growing influence of evolutionary thought, past societies were increasingly taken to be 
naturally more primitive than modern ones. Victorian psychologists and anthropologists 
regarded magical beliefs as relics of the distant past, and their survival as evidence of 
insufficient advancement.59 Folklorists and orientalists found evidence of such relics 
elsewhere, beyond the urban west, in rural areas and colonial India.60 Within this wider 
narrative, modern audiences could watch a magic trick, and understand that it was trickery, 
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while imagining how their primitive ancestors would have been less rational than them. They 
could hear how colonial subjects, in India or Africa, still believed that such things were 
real.61  
 The portrayal of others as irrational or credulous was hardly new, nor was it an 
accusation reserved for those in the past. However, throughout the nineteenth century, it 
became a core theme of what it meant to be modern, as part of the narrative of the 
progressive development of Western society from superstition to reason. In the process of 
constructing a modern narrative of progress, whether romantic or rationalist, there was no 
reason to question the idea that magic tricks were once mistaken for witchcraft. The view 
expressed by Reginald Scot was also expressed by Walter Scott, who claimed that “the 
common feats of jugglers, or professors of legerdemain” were “wonders at which in our 
fathers' time men would have cried out either sorcery or miracles.”62 Three generations later, 
in Lecky’s History of the rise and influence of the spirit of rationalism in Europe (1913), 
Reginald Scot was still being praised for his enlightened exposure of “juggling tricks that 
were ascribed to the devil.”63  
 The theme was reinforced by Victorian conjurors, who had their own agenda. In their 
bid for greater respectability, which provided not only increased social status but also 
financial rewards, Victorian conjurors regularly stressed the modern and scientific nature of 
magic by demonstrating chemical and optical processes, exhibiting mechanical marvels and 
preaching that conjuring was based on scientific principles.64 In word and deed, they 
debunked modern spiritualism, often denounced as a modern form of witchcraft, and 
frequently stressed that their own kind of magic was for modern, rational audiences.65 “The 
time is quite gone by when people really believe that conjuring is to be done by supernatural 
agencies,” declared the Victorian conjuror, Colonel Stodare. He argued, “the audience are 
clearly aware that no more is assumed to be presented to them than a very striking illusion.”66 
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Indeed, Victorian magicians often presented themselves as agents of rational change. Signor 
Blitz, for example, noted that earlier generations “had not the penetrating powers of the 
present day,” and claimed that his “exhibitions were of a nature calculated to remove the 
long-prevailing impressions attached to the history of magic.”67 As the magician, Edwin 
Sachs, declared, “there are now very few people who attribute the successes of a conjuror to 
any other agency than his own skill.”68 The theme could also be found more widely in 
reviews of conjuring shows that remarked how, if such illusions had been performed in the 
past, the magician would have been burnt at the stake.69 
 It was in this context of a narrative of progress that the earliest histories of conjuring 
emerged, which repeated similar themes as they contrasted the magic of past and present. 
Thomas Frost’s Lives of the Conjurors (1876) referred to conjuring tricks in an age of “partial 
and feeble mental illumination” that was lacking “the light of modern science,” when “many, 
even among the educated and better informed, regarded as real what the least educated 
spectator of the present day would know to be illusory.”70 He complained about the 
“persecution of conjurors” in this period, blaming it on the ubiquity of weak-minded people 
who were “ready to declare that such things could be done only by the aid of the devil.”71 In 
Ancient and Modern Magic (1879), Arprey Vere contrasted “our forefathers,” who “flew to 
the aid of diablerie and the supernatural for an elucidation of the mystery,” with the present 
age, “which is distinguished for its matter-of fact treatment of all that appears mysterious and 
unusual … and banished, or almost banished, those dread preventives of progress and 
civilization.”72 “We believe,” declared Paul Carus, in his introduction to H. R. Evans’ The 
Old and the New Magic (1909), that “the spread of modern magic and its proper 
comprehension are an important sign of progress.”73 This new magic, which he explicitly 
described as the product of evolution, had “originated from the old magic when the belief in 
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sorcery began to break down in the eighteenth century,” and was “accomplished with the help 
of science and without the least pretense of supernatural powers.”74  
 The idea that magic tricks had been mistaken for witchcraft, however, remained 
entirely without support. Frost repeated the claims of Scot and Ady, but his only example was 
of “a juggler [who] was, in the reign of Elizabeth, condemned as a wizard, and would have 
been pilloried but for the interposition of the Earl of Leicester.”75 The juggler to whom Frost 
referred was, in fact, the same man who had been cited by Thomas Ady, and who had been 
described by Scot as an occultist, not an entertainer.76 Nevertheless, despite the lack of 
evidence, these early histories managed to provide an impression of a shift in the perception 
of magic. The story of magic told by Frost was a mixture of references to ancient religion, 
magic tricks, and the occult until the eighteenth century, after which it became a more 
focused story about modern stage magic. Evans also included references to ancient priests 
and the occult in his brief coverage of the period before the eighteenth century when magic 
was finally “shorn of its charlatanism.”77 Such a shift in focus gave the impression that magic 
tricks, prior to the eighteenth century, had been confused with genuine magic. 
  
The Discovery of Witchcraft Accusations 
 Subsequent amateur historians of conjuring, who were familiar with this narrative, not 
only continued in a similar vein, but also added alleged examples of early modern conjurors 
who were persecuted. The most important of these was Sidney Clarke who, in his lengthy 
Annals of Conjuring, published from 1924 to 1928, sought to describe the “beginnings, 
progress and modern development of that branch of the art of entertaining.”78 In doing so, 
though he criticized earlier historians of magic for confusing different kinds of magic. He 
continued to express the view that “until comparatively modern times, everything 
uncommon, everything that could not be accounted for by known and familiar means, was 
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attributed to a diabolical origin.”79 In support of this claim, Clarke described a girl who, in 
the fifteenth century, had been charged with witchcraft in Cologne: she had “torn a 
handkerchief into pieces and immediately afterwards produced it whole and entire; surely a 
sleight of hand trick.” “In 1571,” he continued, “a juggler who did card tricks in Paris was 
imprisoned on a charge of witchcraft.” He also cited the case of Triscalinus, who had 
performed before Charles IX of France: when he caused finger rings to fly through the air, 
“the company rose against him and compelled him to confess Satanic aid!”80  
 Clarke provided no sources for these claims, but it seems clear from the content and 
form that the main source was an essay by Richard Cumberland, published in 1823.81 The 
original source of the story about the girl in Cologne, however, is Johannes Nider’s 
Formicarius. This had been published in 1475, but had been completed before Nider’s death 
in 1438. According to Nider, he had been told the story by Brother Heinrich Kalteisen. 
Kalteisen, an inquisitor, had heard it from people in Cologne.82 In other words, even the 
original source is a third-hand account. Furthermore, even if we take the original source at 
face value, the Cologne girl was no street entertainer, but a young woman who claimed that 
she was Joan of Arc, resurrected by God. When two parties were disputing the jurisdiction of 
the church, she boasted that she could secure the French throne for one of them. She carried 
weapons, drank excessively and dressed in men’s clothing. Since this woman claimed to have 
been raised from the dead, she quite possibly claimed to possess magical powers. Indeed, this 
may even have been why she resurrected the torn napkin and the broken glass. Nevertheless, 
whatever claims she might have made, about the tricks that she might have performed, the 
tricks were described by Nider as “frivolities,” while there are clearly other reasons for her 
arrest.83 
 Clarke’s next example was the “juggler” who, according to him, was imprisoned for 
performing card tricks in Paris in 1571. He was subsequently cited, by other amateur 
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historians of magic, as an example of how innocent performers were persecuted for 
witchcraft.84 While none of them provided sources, the origin of the story is probably the 
second edition of Jean Bodin’s Demonomanie, who mentions a sorcerer by the name of 
Trois-eschelles.85 The ‘trick’ involved a deck of cards, but it was hardly a conventional card 
trick. In 1571, according to Bodin, the sorcerer accosted a priest in front of his parishioners. 
He accused the priest of being a hypocrite, who pretends to carry a breviary, but actually 
carries a pack of cards. When the priest tried to show that he was carrying a breviary, he 
discovered what seemed to be a pack of cards, and others present thought this too. The priest 
then threw it away, and left confused. However, when some others picked up what he had 
thrown away, they discovered that it was a breviary after all. Bodin describes this as an 
illusion, in the sense that it did not really happen: the sorcerer had dazzled the eyes of the 
people, but only the people who had been there from the start experienced the illusion; those 
who arrived later only saw a breviary.86 
 In other words, this seems to be a story about an induced hallucination, which relies 
on diabolical powers to deceive people into thinking that a holy book has transformed into 
something rather more profane. Like later stories about mass hallucination, it suggests that if 
you arrive after the induction period, you will not see anything happen. This kind of magic 
was discussed by others at the time, and linked to satanic powers.87 However, this is not a 
card trick performed by a contemporary street entertainer. Furthermore, we are told that the 
sorcerer was condemned for a quite different feat (which, as we shall see shortly, does not 
sound like a magic trick either). He was not executed, but pardoned by the king, on condition 
that he revealed the names of fellow sorcerers. This may be an example of persecution, but it 
does not appear to be an example of being persecuted for performing a magic trick. 
 Part of the problem is what is lost, or perhaps gained, in translation. This is the case 
with Clarke’s final example, Triscalinus, who was supposedly condemned for making finger 
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rings fly through the air. Clarke had got this from Cumberland’s 1823 article, who had got it 
from Bodin.88 In the French original, Bodin described a sorcerer, who had demonstrated a 
feat in front of Charles IX of France: it seemed as if the sorcerer had caused several links of a 
gentleman’s gold chain to appear in his hands, but later the chain was found to be in one 
piece. In the process of translating this into Latin, “links” had been transformed into “rings,” 
which were then assumed to be “finger rings,” and finger rings (like a pack of cards) are the 
kinds of things with which magicians do tricks. However, in the original, this sounds no more 
like a contemporary magic trick than the ‘card trick’ described above. Perhaps more 
importantly, the man called Triscalinus (in Latin) had been called, in the original French, 
Trois-eschelles. Due to the translation, it had not been noticed that this was the very same 
sorcerer who had (seemingly) turned a breviary into a pack of cards in 1571. In other words, 
in the process of translation, not only the quality but also the quantity of evidence was 
exaggerated.  
 Nevertheless, subsequent amateur historians of magic continued to find evidence of 
persecution. Milbourne Christopher’s popular Illustrated History of Magic (1973) repeated 
the claim that it was because “many people thought sleight-of-hand men needed the devil’s 
help with their tricks [that] Scot decided to set them straight.”89 In doing so, Christopher 
described another alleged victim, a magician called Reatius who, after performing in Mantua 
and Padua, was “seized and tortured until he admitted he produced his deceptions with sleight 
of hand and the help of confederates.”90 According to Christopher, this was an example of a 
conjuror “who claimed no demonic powers.”91 Christopher’s unnamed source is presumably 
(directly or indirectly) Johannes Weyer’s De praestigiis demonum (1563), which refers to a 
conjuror who was seen at Mantua and Padua, was seized by the inquisition, and confessed 
that he used trickery.92 Weyer, in turn, was clear about his source, which was a book by 
Pietro Pomponazzi, the Renaissance scholar at the University of Padua, published around 
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1520. In the original source, Reatius is certainly not described as a conjuror “who claimed no 
demonic powers.” On the contrary, he is described as someone who practiced divination, and 
who cheated when he did. There is nothing to suggest that Reatius performed magic tricks as 
entertainment, only that he used trickery to pretend that he had clairvoyant powers.93 
 In other words, there remained no evidence that performers of magic tricks, as 
opposed to those who pretended to have genuine powers, were persecuted as witches.94 The 
claim was based, rather ironically, on mistaking one kind of magic for another. Nevertheless, 
it continued to give the impression that early modern audiences struggled to distinguish 
between magic tricks and witchcraft, and that “modern magic” was, in this sense, a different 
kind of magic. As we have seen, this has not been a view that has been reflected in academic 
early modern history. However, it has recently become a theme in modern cultural history. 
 
A Modern Kind of Magic? 
 Several cultural historians have examined how modern forms of enchantment – such 
as mesmerism, spiritualism, psychical research and modern forms of occultism – continued to 
be intrinsically bound up with wider social, cultural and, indeed, scientific views.95 In the 
midst of this, some scholars have presented “modern magic” as a form of disenchanted 
magic, in which modern audiences could now engage with magic as fiction rather than as 
fact.96 According to James Cook, “modern magic” was an “explicitly disenchanted post-
Enlightenment form of entertainment,” having transformed from a “somewhat shady and 
morally suspect form of realism to a more self-conscious and respectable mode of 
illusionism.”97 “From about 1700,” Simon During explains, “magic slowly became 
disconnected from supernature;” unlike the “old magic” of the supernatural, “modern magic” 
was secular and natural: it was a kind of fiction, in which people suspended disbelief, but in 
which they did not believe.98 This involved, in the words of Michael Saler, “a rational 
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process that stimulated the sense of wonder while honing cognitive skills that could prevent 
beguilement;” as a result, it could “delight one’s reason and imagination without deluding 
them.”99 This ability to “delight but not delude,” to be deceived without believing it is real, 
has been seen as a “distinctly modern form of enchantment,” and linked to “distinctively 
modern cognitive repertoires … audiences must be willing to be deceived but not so 
credulous as to mistake illusions for reality.”100 As Graham Jones further explains: “modern 
magic requires audiences to implement a culturally specific interpretative repertoire – 
indulging in awe but imagining naturalistic explanations for the magician’s effects.”101  
 In other words, while it may be obvious to us today that this is how we experience 
magic tricks, in the full awareness that they are illusions and that we are being tricked, the 
claim here is that there is something specifically modern about it. This, then, is a diluted 
version of the claims of earlier amateur historians. It suggests that, in the modern period, we 
began to view magic tricks differently: now they could delight us rather than delude us, as we 
suspended our disbelief about magic, rather than believing that it was real. The context, of 
course, is different. The aim, according to the most important of these histories, Simon 
During’s Modern Enchantments, is to demonstrate the cultural significance of “secular 
magic,” by which he means magic that “stakes no serious claim to contact with the 
supernatural.” In presenting this as a modern form of enchantment, which emerged from the 
eighteenth century, he draws on Coleridge’s notion of a “willing suspension of disbelief.”102  
 However, in certain respects, the book reflects earlier amateur histories of magic.103 It 
provides an impression of a shift in the perception of magic in the eighteenth century, in its 
discussion of references to occult magic prior to this period. For example, we are told what 
Seneca the Younger, Augustine, and Francis Bacon wrote about occult magic, but not what 
they said about magic tricks.104 However, Seneca the Younger also referred to the juggler’s 
“cup and dice,” and how the trickery pleased him.105 Augustine described how people “watch 
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carefully and pay close attention to the conjurer, who freely acknowledges that he uses 
nothing but trickery.”106 Bacon describes juggling tricks as forms of deception in several 
places, including his account of the card trick above, which he thought was the result of 
confederacy.107 Whatever these individuals wrote about occult magic, they described magic 
tricks as the product of trickery. 
 Nevertheless, During suggests an early modern difficulty in distinguishing between 
jugglers and occult magic. In doing so, he provides two examples of individuals who “did not 
distinguish between occult and entertainment magic in the way we do today.”108 One is 
Thomas Nashe who, in a fictional tale, made a casual comparison of Scoto to Cornelius 
Agrippa, but did not claim that Scoto performed real magic. The other is King James who, 
according to During, accused Scoto of having diabolical assistance. However, James did not 
actually make such an accusation. He used Scoto as an example of a juggler, who deceived 
the senses with juggling tricks.109 Furthermore, around the same time, “an Italian juggler” 
performed for James’ son.110 Whether or not this was Scoto himself, he was presumably not 
suspected of being in league with the devil. Indeed, this may have been the same “Italian” 
who had recently performed magic for Elizabeth I, and who had been paid handsomely for 
his “wonderful tricks upon the cards.”111 Following the royal performance, he was engaged 
by other respectable folk, all of whom, like James, were clearly capable of distinguishing 
between occult and entertainment magic.  
  There is, then, no reason to think that “modern magic,” as a form of magic that 
audiences explicitly viewed as an illusion, and imagined how it might be done, was 
particularly modern. In this case, the confusion has come from drawing on literary theory, 
rather than on evidence, particularly the assumption that a “willing suspension of disbelief” is 
a useful lens through which one can understand how magic is viewed. Magic, however, does 
not rely on a willing suspension of disbelief.112 Rather, it depends on audiences believing one 
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aspect of it, while disbelieving another. On the one hand, certain actions of the performer are 
supposed to be believed by the audience. They are supposed to be convinced that the selected 
card is genuinely lost, or that the box is really empty, otherwise there can be no magical 
effect. On the other hand, the audience is not supposed to believe that other elements of the 
performance are real. When the magician waves a wand, or says “hocus pocus,” the audience 
is not supposed to think that this is really how it works. Modern audiences understand this, 
but so did early modern audiences. What the evidence shows is that, for centuries, jugglers 
have said “hocus pocus,” and have waved their magic wands, and audiences have understood 
that they were watching a trick. 
 There have, of course, been a variety of changes in how magic tricks have been 
experienced. For example, new venues provided a context of increased respectability, and 
allowed for the use of new and more elaborate technology, and grander sets, for larger 
audiences.113 Conjurors often tapped into contemporary concerns, such as the phenomena of 
spiritualism, the mystic East or, in the case of sawing a woman in half, women’s suffrage.114 
They adapted to new forms of media, by performing mind-reading tricks on radio and ‘close-
up’ tricks on television, and by exploiting such contexts to use novel techniques that would 
not have worked with a live audience.115 There was also a broader but subtler change in how 
magic was experienced. From the late sixteenth century, a growing number of books were 
published that revealed how magic tricks were done and, from the late nineteenth century, 
these became significantly more detailed, and included descriptions of how magicians 
“misdirected” their audiences. Such exposure continued throughout the twentieth century, in 
an increasing number of popular books, on television and the internet. As such knowledge 
was increasingly disseminated, it became possible to observe a magic trick while imagining a 
larger number of ways in which it might be done, and with a greater awareness that the 
magician was playing with one’s mind.116  
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 All of this naturally reflected wider changes in society, but the core experience of 
magic remained essentially the same: it was of a seemingly impossible effect that one 
understood to be an illusion. The public may have become more aware of how magic tricks 
were done, but magicians responded by developing new physical and psychological 
techniques, so that they could continue to present illusions that seemed impossible. Such 
techniques, of course, could also be used to pretend to have psychic, supernatural or, more 
recently, psychological abilities, and these have continued to convince many. 
 
Conclusion 
 In contrast with recent cultural history, then, this article has stressed continuity in how 
a particular kind of magic has been seen. Indeed, it is this very continuity that has allowed 
magic tricks to serve a variety of rhetorical purposes across different historical contexts. 
Since at least the sixteenth century, they have been used to argue both for and against the 
reality of genuine magic, and to illustrate the fallibility of our vision and our vulnerability to 
deception. In the early modern period, this was in relation to particular contemporary 
concerns about the reality and dangers of witchcraft and increasing uncertainty about the 
reliability of vision, though they had been used as examples of the fallibility of vision since 
Plato.117 
 As for their role in the debate about witchcraft, it was often surprisingly similar to 
modern debates about different kinds of magic. As demonologists constructed different 
categories of magic, they provided a variety of options that one could take in relation to a 
particular case, and what is striking to anyone familiar with modern debates about psychic 
phenomena is how familiar the options seem. The option of trickery could serve as a natural 
explanation or could be rejected as an inadequate explanation. A delusion could serve as a 
natural explanation or could be attributed to a supernatural source. The view that some 
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individuals mixed trickery with the real thing was frequently expressed in the nineteenth 
century about mesmerists and spiritualist mediums, and it has continued to be said about 
almost every famous psychic since.118  
 Meanwhile, there were always people who mistook trickery for the real thing, since 
trickery was used to deceive in different ways. Clearly there were those who used sleight of 
hand to cheat with cards and dice, and to con the public with ‘fast and loose’. There were 
mountebanks who sold ineffective ointments by pretending to be wounded, and then 
pretending to be healed.119 And, of course, there were individuals who pretended that they 
had genuine magical powers. However, trickery has continued to be used by con artists, fake 
healers, and pseudo-psychics, and many people continue to be deceived. Whether this 
happens, at any given time, has always depended on a variety of factors, so much so that even 
modern scientists and sceptics have mistaken trickery for the real thing.120 While one should 
not exaggerate the similarities, of course, one can nevertheless see notable continuities in 
how we have tried to separate one kind of magic from another. 
  In terms of magic tricks themselves, however, the continuity argument is simpler. The 
venues, costumes, and sets may have changed, the audiences and illusions may have grown, 
and the degree of respectability may have risen, along with the price of admission. However, 
centuries before the rise of “modern magic,” whatever other magical beliefs might have been 
in play, our ancestors were able to recognize magic tricks as a form of entertainment, 
understand that they were illusions, and wonder how they were done. The claim that they 
mistook them for genuine magic was originally deployed for rhetorical purposes, and was 
later taken at face value, in the context of various modern attempts to separate one kind of 
magic from another. The historical narratives of past credulity that were constructed, then, far 
from being a reflection of early modern gullibility, were actually part of a modern struggle to 
distinguish between different kinds of magic. 
  25 
Endnotes 
1 Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft (London, 1584), 174-5. On the book and its 
general reception, see: Philip C. Almond, England’s First Demonologist: Reginald Scot and 
“The Discoverie of Witchcraft” (London, 2011); S.F. Davies, “The Reception of Reginald 
Scot’s Discovery of Witchcraft: Witchcraft, Magic, and Radical Religion,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 74 (2013): 381-401. 
2 Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft, 174-5. 
3 Two seminal works in this shift of thinking were Hugh Trevor-Roper’s “The European 
Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in his Religion, the Reformation 
and Social Change (London, 1967), and Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic 
(London, 1971). 
4 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the 
Experimental Life (Princeton, 1985); Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford, 1997); P. Elmer, “Science, Medicine and 
Witchcraft,” in Johnathon Barry and Owen Davies (eds.), Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft 
Historiography (Basingstoke, 2007), 33-51. 
5 Peter Dear, “Miracles, Experiments and the Ordinary Course of Nature,” Isis 81 (1990): 
663-683; Lorraine Daston, “Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern 
Europe,” Critical Inquiry 18 (1991): 93-124; Palmira Fontes da Costa, “The Making of 
Extraordinary Facts: Authentication of Singularities of Nature at the Royal Society of 
London in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 33 (2002): 265-288. On more recent debates about extraordinary phenomena as an 
arena in which criteria for establishing facts were constructed, see: Peter Lamont, 
Extraordinary Beliefs: A Historical Approach to a Psychological Problem  (Cambridge, 
2013). 
6 Willem de Blécourt and Owen Davies (eds.), Witchcraft Continued: Popular Magic in 
Modern Europe (Manchester, 2004); Karl Bell, The Magical Imagination: Magic and 
Modernity in Urban England, 1780-1914 (Cambridge, 2012). 
7 Malcolm Gaskill, “The Pursuit of Reality: Recent Research into the History of Witchcraft,” 
Historical Journal 51 (2008): 1073. 
8 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 304; P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, The Occult 
in Early Modern Europe: A Documentary History (Basingstoke, 1999), 160. 
9 Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern Europe (Oxford, 2009). 
10 For example, Clark (ibid., 82) notes that the minister, Richard Bernard, condemned 
jugglers alongside witchcraft, but it was for being “lewd and vain,” and perhaps 
blasphemous, not because they were thought to be genuine [Richard Bernard, A Guide for 
Grand-Jury Men, (London, 1630), 92]. 
11 Peter Lamont, “Spiritualism and a Mid-Victorian Crisis of Evidence,” Historical Journal, 
47 (2004): 906; Michael Mangan, Performing Dark Arts: A Cultural History of Conjuring 
(Bristol, 2007), 39. 
12 Scot, Discoverie, 174. 
                                                 
  26 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 Brandon was the king’s juggler until about 1540 [Philip Butterworth, Magic on the Early 
English Stage (Cambridge, 2005), 9], when Scot would have been two years old. 
14 Butterworth, Magic on the Early English Stage, 12. 
15 Ibid., 182. 
16 S. R[id], The Art of Jugling, or legerdemaine (London, 1612); [Vincent], Hocus Pocus 
Junior; Neve, The Merry Companion. 
17 Thomas Ady, A Candle in the Dark (London, 1655), 169. 
18 Ady, Candle in the Dark, 41. 
19 Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft, 272. 
20 John Webster, The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft (London, 1677), 61; Francis 
Hutchinson, An Historical Essay Concerning Witchcraft (London, 1718), 9. 
21 My use of “frame” is based on Erving Goffman’s notion of the term, which is similar to the 
notion of “schema,” and which refers to how we define our experience at any given time 
(Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York, 
1974). On its application to magic, see: Peter Lamont, “Magician as Conjuror: A Frame 
Analysis of Victorian Mediums,” Early Popular Visual Culture 4 (2006): 131-142.  
22 For example, magic props were made by Rob. Spooner of Achorn in the Long Walk 
between Christ Church and Lume-Hospital (J. M., Sports and pastimes, 26). 
23 Thomas Hill, A Brief and Pleasant Treatise, Entitled Natural and Artificial Conclusions 
(London, 1581); Bruno Roy, “The Household Encyclopedia as Magic Kit: Medieval Popular 
Interest in Pranks and Illusions,” Journal of Popular Culture 14 (1980), 60-69; Richard 
Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2000), 91. 
24 Jean Prevost, Clever and Pleasant Inventions. Part One (Seattle, 1998), 5-9. 
25 N. W. Bawcutt, “Michael Vincent, alias Hocus Pocus: A Travelling Entertainer of the 
Seventeenth Century,” Theatre Notebook 54 (2000): 130-8; Clarke, Annals, 24; Edwin 
Dawes, “The Italian Court Conjurer Hieronymus Scotto: New Light on His Portrait in Wax,” 
Magic Circular 87 (1993): 152. 
26 Ottokar Fischer, “Hieronymus Scotto: An Unknown Conjurer of the Renaissance,” The 
Sphinx 36 (1937): 14-15. 
27 P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, The Occult in Early Modern Europe: A Documentary History (New 
York, 1999), 1601. 
28 Francis Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, or A Natural History in Ten Centuries (London. 1670), 
207.  
29 Butterworth, Magic on the Early English Stage, 166. 
30 Louis B. Wright, “Juggling Tricks and Conjury on the English Stage before 1642,” Modern 
Philology, 24 (1926-7): 269-84, 270, 283. 
31 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 28, 129, 319. 
  27 
                                                                                                                                                       
32 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 248. 
33 The Malleus Maleficarum of Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, Translated with 
Introductions, Bibliography and Notes by Rev. Montague Summers (London, 1928), 59. 
34 Ibid.; Nathanael Homes, Daemonologe and Theologie (London, 1650), p. 44. 
35 William Perkins, A Discourse of the Damned So Farre Forth as It is Revealed in the 
Scriptures, and Manifest by True Experience (Cambridge, 1608), 159. 
36 Owen Davies, The Haunted: A Social History (London, 2009), 67. 
37 Scot, Discoverie, 79ff. 
38 Scot, Discoverie, 180; Ady, Candle in the Dark, 31. 
39 Webster, Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft, 154-5. 
40 Joseph Glanvill, Saducismus Triumphatus, or, Full and Plain Evidence Concerning 
Witches and Apparitions (London, 1681), 39-43. 
41 Glanvill, Saducismus Triumphatus, 23. 
42 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 151-2. 
43 Clark, Thinking with Demons, 195ff. 
44 Jean Bodin, On the Demon-Mania of the Witches. Translated by R. A. Scott. Toronto, 
1580/1995), 242. 
45 John Foxe, The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe, 4th edition (1583), book 5, 548. The 
Unabridged Acts and Monuments Online or TAMO (HRI Online Publications, Sheffield, 
2011). Available from: http//www.johnfoxe.org [Accessed: 12.09.14] 
46 P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, Martin Del Rio: Investigations into Magic (Manchester, 2000), 54. 
47 Philip Butterworth, “Brandon, Feats and Hocus Pocus: jugglers three,” Theatre Notebook 
57 (2003): 94. 
48 Scot, Discoverie, 74, 82. 
49 Butterworth, Magic on the early English stage 14-15. 
50 This was the view of Sir Richard Carew, though based on a second-hand account from his 
cousin, written more than forty years after the event (Butterworth, Magic on the Early 
English Stage, 15). 
51 His sources referred to the claim that jugglers might, in addition to performing tricks, also 
indulge in witchcraft (Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 304) 
52 Max Maven, “I’ll Build a Stairway to a Paradox,” Magic 5 (1995): 23. 
53 Scot had justified his exposure of jugglers’ secrets on the grounds that it was for the greater 
good (Scot, Discoverie, 182). Subsequent books, which plagiarized his section on magic 
tricks, also borrowed his justification, though they said little else about witchcraft itself 
(R[id], The Art of Juggling; [Vincent], Hocus Pocus Junior; Neve, The Merry Companion). 
  28 
                                                                                                                                                       
54 Prevost, Clever and Pleasant Inventions, 8. 
55 William Hooper, Rational Recreations, in which the principle of numbers and natural 
philosophy are clearly and copiously elucidated, by a series of easy, entertaining, interesting 
experiments (London, 1774), preface; Breslaw’s Last Legacy (London, 1784), ix-xi. 
56 Thomas Frost, The Lives of the Conjurors (London, 1876), 83, 102, 112-113, 133. 
57 Owen Davies, Witchcraft, Magic and Culture, 1736-1951 (Manchester, 1999), 7. 
58 Davies, Witchcraft, Magic and Culture. On natural magic, see: Walter Scott, Letters on 
Demonology and Witchcraft (London, 1830), 320; David Brewster, Letters on Natural Magic 
(London, 1832); William Godwin, Lives of the Necromancers (London: 1834). 
59 Randall Styers, Making Magic: Religion, Magic and Science in the Modern World 
(Oxford, 2004), 74ff. 
60 Owen Davies, Cunning-folk: Popular Magic in English History (London, 2003), 53; 
Ronald Inden, Imagining India (London, 1990). 
61 P. Lamont, “Conjuring Images of India,” Social History 32 (2007), 308-324; G. Jones, 
“Modern Magic and the War on Miracles in French Colonial Culture,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 52 (2010), 66-99. 
62 Scott, Letters on Demonology, 379-80. Scott, despite his fondness for folklore, shared the 
view that witchcraft was primarily a thing of the past, and that this was a positive 
development (ibid., 320). 
63 W. E. H. Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe 
(London, 1913), 104. 
64 Edwin A. Dawes, The Great Illusionists (Secaucus, 1979); James Cook, The Arts of 
Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum (Cambridge, 2001). 
65 Lamont, “Spiritualism and a Mid-Victorian Crisis of Evidence.” 
66 Colonel Stodare, Fly-notes, or Conjuring Made Easy (London, 1867), 5-6. 
67 Antonio Blitz, Fifty Years in the Magic Circle (San Francisco, 1871), 54, 86. 
68 Edwin Sachs, Sleight of Hand (London, 1885), 2. 
69 Bell, The Magical Imagination, 94. 
70 Frost, The Lives of the Conjurors, 60. 
71 Ibid., 83. 
72 Arprey Vere, Ancient and Modern Magic, with Explanations of Some of the Best Known 
Tricks Performed by Messrs Maskelyne and Cooke (London, 1879), 81. 
73 Henry Ridgley Evans, The Old and the New Magic (Chicago, 1909), xviii. 
74 Evans, The Old and the New Magic, xvi; see also Albert A. Hopkins, Magic: Stage 
Illusions and Scientific Diversions, Including Trick Photography (New York, 1897), 6. 
  29 
                                                                                                                                                       
75 Frost, Lives of the Conjurors, 82-102. 
76 Mangan,. Performing Dark Arts, 36. 
77 Evans, Old and New Magic, 18. 
78 Clarke, Annals, 1. 
79 Ibid., 4, 15. 
80 Ibid., 15. 
81 For example, according to both, the girl had torn the handkerchief “into pieces and 
immediately afterwards produced it whole and entire,” and she had done this “in the presence 
of a great company of noble spectators.” Richard Cumberland, “Account of Magic from the 
Old Christian Writers, with Several Anecdotes of Magicans, & C,” in L. T. Berguer, The 
British Essayists, with Prefaces Biographical, Historical and Critical, vol. 38 (London, 
1823), 197-206. 
82 P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, Witch Beliefs and Witch Trials in the Middle Ages: Documents and 
Readings (London, 2011), 145-6. 
83 Ibid., 146. 
84 Christopher, Illustrated History, 23; Gerlad Gardner, The Meaning of Witchcraft (London, 
1959), 91; Bouffard, The Magicians Fight! (Pomona, 2008), 28. 
85 Jean Bodin, De la démonomanie des sorciers (Paris, 1587). At different points in the third 
book, Bodin describes him variously as “Des-eschelles” and “Trois-eschelles,” but it is 
obvious from the context that this is the same individual. 
86 Ibid., 154. 
87 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 80-1. 
88 Cumberland, “Account of Magic,” 204. 
89 Christopher, Illustrated History, 23. 
90 Ibid., 16-17. 
91 Ibid., 23. 
92 C. H. Lea, Materials towards a History of Witchcraft. Volume II. Edited by A. C. Howland 
(New York, 1957), 493. 
93 Pietro Pomponazzi, De Naturalium Effectuum Causis, sive de Incantatibus. (Basel, 1520), 
59-61. Pomponazzi mentions Reatius during a discussion of a case of the ‘moving sieve’ 
(cribrum moto). This was a form of magical divination, in which a sieve was suspended on 
shears, and would turn in response to questions being asked (Scot, Discoverie, 149). 
Pomponazzi is considering that the sorcerer could use deception to move the sieve without 
being noticed, and Reatius is mentioned as an example of someone who practiced such 
deception, and was punished for it. My thanks to John Forrester for his assistance in 
translating, and discussing, the relevant passage. 
  30 
                                                                                                                                                       
94 Indeed, even references that suggest confusion need to be treated with caution. For 
example, one writer claimed that a man who performed some tricks was accused by the 
audience of being a witch, and had to reveal how they were done to avoid being thrown out 
of a window. However, this was in a book containing practical jokes and tricks for the 
amusement of schoolboys, which also explained how to steal a cloak (and then, if Satan 
betrays you, how to lie before a magistrate) [J. M., Sports and pastimes, or Sport for the city 
and Pastime for the Country (London, 1676), 21-27]. Clearly, his young readers were not 
supposed to take this seriously. Indeed, he would hardly have taught them how to perform 
tricks, if this was likely to lead to them being accused of witchcraft. 
95 Janet Oppenheim, The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 
1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1988); Alex Owen, The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism 
and the Culture of the Modern (Chicago, 2004); Alison Winter, Mesmerized: Powers of Mind 
in Victorian Britain (Chicago, 1997). 
96 For an overview see: Michael Saler, “Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic 
Review,” American Historical Review, 111 (2006): 692-716. 
97 Cook, The Arts of Deception, 93, 179. 
98 Simon During, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic (Cambridge, 
2002), 14, 27. 
99 Saler, “Modernity and Enchantment,” 713. 
100 Ibid., 714; Graham M. Jones, “Modern Magic,” 68. 
101 Jones, “Modern Magic,” 95. 
102 During, Modern Enchantments, 44-45. 
103 During’s sources, not surprisingly, include Frost, Evans, Clarke and Christopher. 
104 During, Modern Enchantments, 3, 6, 7, 20, 39. 
105 L. A. Seneca, Moral Epistles. Translated by Richard M. Gunmere. The Loeb Classical 
Library. 3 vols. Volume I. Cambridge, 1917), 295. 
106 Pierre Taillefer, “Conjurers around the Mediterranean Basin”, Gibecière, 10, 1 (2015): 53-
100, 85).  
107 Bacon, Sylva Sylvarum, 207. 
108 During, Modern Enchantments, 57. 
109 James VI, King of Scotland, Daemonologie, in Forme of a Diaologue, Divided into Three 
Bookes (Edinburgh, 1597), 22. 
110 This was between 1594 and 1612 [D. Cook and F. P Wilson, (eds.), Malone Society. 
Collections VI: Dramatic Records in the Declared Accounts of the Treasurer of the Chamber 
1558-1642 (Oxford, 1961). 
111 Dawes, “Italian Court Conjurer,” 152. 
  31 
                                                                                                                                                       
112 Darwin Ortiz, Strong Magic: Creative Showmanship for the Close-Up Magician. Silver 
Spring,1994), 25-6; Jamy Ian Swiss, Shattering Illusions (Seattle, 2002), 21; Lamont, 
Extraordinary Beliefs, 45. 
113 Cook, The Arts of Deception; During, Modern Enchantments; Jim Steinmeyer, Hiding the 
Elephant (New York, 2003). 
114 Lamont, “Spiritualism and a Mid-Victorian Crisis of Evidence”; Lamont, “Conjuring 
Images of India”; Steinmeyer, Hiding the Elephant, 292-3. 
115 Mangan, Dark Arts, 174-180; Steinmeyer, Hiding the Elephant, 259-260. 
116 Peter Lamont, A Particular Kind of Wonder: The Experience of Magic Past and Present 
(forthcoming). 
117 Barbara Maria Stafford, Artful Science: Enlightenment Entertainment and the Eclipse of 
Visual Education (Cambridge, 1994); Clark, Vanities of the Eye. 
118 On the persistence of such themes, see: Lamont, Extraordinary Beliefs. 
119 Butterworth, Magic on the Early English Stage, 163. 
120 Lamont, Extraordinary Beliefs, 245. 
